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1. INTRODUCTION: 
DEFINITION AND MEANING 
Endemic among you there is, I know, 
either skepticism about the claims of 
international law to reflect a legal order 
or annoyance at both the restraints you 
feel that international law imposes on 
you and the protections it seems, from 
your perspective, to give to wrongdoing 
states. Today I am going to try to 
dissolve that skepticism and to demon-
strate that, although you may feel inter-
national law's restraints to be irksome, 
they can also limit your adversary, your 
competitor, so that he too can be 
brought to feel their discipline. Much, 
indeed, of what arouses your skepticism 
or engages your impatience may not so 
often be the restraints of law as chosen 
policies of self-restraint or of permissive-
ness to others. International law may 
not, in all cases, require the kind of 
conduct which engages your cynicism. 
But first we need to clear up a few 
preliminary matters; for example, what 
we mean by such terms as "law" and 
"international law. " 
Many people ask, when they look at 
the international order and see that 
there are none of the regular institutions 
of a domestic legal order, no legislature, 
no executive with law-enforcement 
authority, and no system of courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction: "How can in-
ternationallaw be law at all?" Now this 
brings me to my first point. Only too 
often people confuse a significant dis-
cussion about the nature of things, or 
the nature of law, as in this case, with a 
trivial argument about the meaning of 
words. Let me illustrate this. 
Most people's concept of law, even 
today, is based on an authoritarian 
model which can be stated in general 
terms as a general command issued by a 
sovereign authority owning no political 
superior, enforced by the authority of a 
system of courts, and administered by 
an executive authority. This is one 
generally accepted definition of the 
word "law." But it is a very narrow, 
restricted view of the law, and it leaves 
out of account very many kinds of law, 
even very many kinds of domestic law. 
On the other hand, its wide acceptance 
stems from the English Utilitarians of a 
century and a half ago, especially 
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, and 
their extensive program of domestic 
legislative reform. One consequence of 
this positivist, utilitarian definition of 
law was that international law came to 
be characterized as "positive morality." 
This illustrates my point. Stipulate a 
narrow definition of the word "law," 
and international law is excluded. On 
the other hand, if you stipulate a 
broader definition of law, international 
law will be included. This reminds me 
about all the controversy which has 
been plaguing the world of literature for 
about a hundred years: "Did William 
Shakespeare really write those plays he 
is credited with?" One answer is: "If he 
did not, then somebody else called 
William Shakespeare did. " 
If anyone says to me, "I stipulate a 
definition of law which will exclude 
international law. Therefore interna-
tional law is not law," I will say, "Well, 
your second sentence, your conclusion, 
is unnecessary; it was already inherent 
in your premise. If you stipulate that 
kind of a definition of law, that is your 
business. And I do not wish to argue 
over trivialities. But I would like to 
point out that you are probably wrong 
in your concept of what law is." This 
last is not a trivial point. It is something 
we should think about-what the nature 
of law is, what its uses are, how we may 
best employ it, and how, indeed, it can 
be utilized to the advantage of the 
Navy, of the United States, of the world 
community, rather than treat it as a 
counter in a parlor game with words. 
II. A LEGAL SYSTEM AT WORK-
SOME "STILL" PICTURES 
I will start my discussion of this 
topic of finding some common models 
or pictures of a legal system with the 
idea that most of us find international 
law a difficult concept to grasp, or a 
difficult thing to think about, because 
our everyday ordinary way of thinking 
about law is the product of common 
experiences-these produce the models 
we have in our heads. For example, a 
common model of the legal system at 
work is the picture of a traffic police-
man booking us for making a left-hand 
turn out of a right-hand lane. Now we 
know there is a rule, we know there is a 
person in authority, and we know we 
have done the wrong thing. And this is 
an easy and simple approach to giving us 
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a model or picture of what law is. 
Behind the policeman is the State Legis-
lature which authorized the writing (or 
indeed may have written itself as is the 
case in some states) the Rules of the 
Road, including the strict requirement 
about not making left-hand turns out of 
right-hand lanes. The policeman himself 
is appointed under laws written by the 
State Legislature, and ultimately his 
appointment has to be valid, as the legal 
provision our citizen has offended has 
to be valid, under the Constitution of 
the State and that of the United States. 
There is thus a legal system which bears 
down on us, possessing the powerful 
and vast machinery of a sovereign state, 
complete with legislature, authoritative 
executive, and, finally, courts with com-
pulsory jurisdiction. (If you make a 
left-hand turn out of a right-hand lane 
you will probably find yourself in one 
of the very minor courts of a great 
hierarchy of judicial institutions.) In 
addition to showing our motoring citi-
zen as feeling very sorry for himself 
while the officer writes out the ticket 
and says, "You shouldn't have done 
that, sir," or words to that effect, there 
is a vast background which the legal 
order provides to this trivial legal event. 
Insofar as this incident has legal signifi-
cance, it involves the whole domestic 
legal order and is governed by it. In this 
way we all see the secure order of great 
richness in commands or, better, pre-
scriptions, rules, institutions, and validly 
appointed legal authorities which keep 
our complex society functioning with 
the minimum of friction and waste. 
Then we look to international law and 
we see none or, at best very little of this 
institutional richness and depth of legal 
rules, institutions, experience, au-
thority, and power. 
I have gone into some detail with this 
picture, this common model of the legal 
order, since many of us and our fellow 
citizens carry it in their heads as their 
belief that it constitutes a "hard-core" 
example of the legal system at work-
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the citizen in his automobile and the 
traffic policeman on his motorcycle. 
This is also in that area of law which 
most pe9ple regard as the paradigm of 
the legal order-the enforcement of the 
criminal law. Let us now go a little 
further. Do you think that in many 
cases when the U.S. Government, for 
example, may have to deal with or-
ganized crime in the United States, the 
law enforcement situation is so simple? 
It seems to me that some research 
worker could probably uncover an 
enormous and intricate system of nego-
tiation, concession, surrender, giving 
ground, claiming ground, and so on, in 
many of the major cases which the 
Federal Government or a State govern-
ment brings against a major representa-
tive of organized crime, in order to 
conduct the case ultimately to the 
conviction and punishment of the 
accused. It seems that when we observe 
governments prosecuting major under-
world figures we are already a long way 
from the clear-cut law-enforcement 
situation of the policeman and the 
motorcar driver or the policeman and 
the petty criminal. Let us go another 
step further. 
Outside the realm of criminal law-
and you will notice that I have kept my 
pictures, so far, in the realms of criminal 
law-we find that there are many more 
diverse ways in which the law operates 
than we are apt to expect inside the area 
of criminal law. We find that the legal 
system appears, mainly, to provide the 
citizen with the procedures, with the 
means, of doing the sort of things he 
wants to do. The Law of Real Property 
is not only a law which tells trespassers 
to keep off your property or be prose-
cuted; it is also a law, a body of very 
intricate law, that tells you how you can 
enjoy what you have and, if you have 
the right kind of interest, the many 
ways in which you can transmit that 
interest or the fruits of it to other 
people; what it can be worth to you in a 
money sense-given the state of the 
market-and how you can enjoy it to its 
best advantage. This is not telling you 
not to do something. There is here 
nothing like an equivalent of disobeying 
a prohibition-for example, making a 
left-hand turn out of a right-hand lane 
or even of belonging to a powerful 
syndicate of criminals running illegal 
"business ventures." This area of law 
tells you what you can do with your 
own so as to effectuate the ma.ximum of 
enjoyment to yourself and with maxi-
mum advantage to your neighbors. 
Again, when a civilian writes a will 
there are certain rules that he must 
fulfill; for example, he must have his 
signature attested to by a certain num-
ber of witnesses (the actual number 
depending on state law); also he must 
follow certain other basic procedures. It 
would, therefore, be wrong to say that 
the law relating to the writing of wills 
consists of commands given by a legisla-
ture and enforced by sanctions-by the 
threat of prosecution and punishment. 
After all, what is the sanction if some-
one writes a will and fails to have it 
testified to by the right number of 
witnesses? The will may be invalid, but 
the citizen will not be punished by any 
decision to invalidate his will. After all, 
he is dead! In this kind of a situation, it 
seems silly to call nullification a sanc-
tion, a threat of punishment. 
The system, the laws we have on 
writing wills, are what we may call 
facultative or facilitating rules. So are all 
the rules which tell us, and institutions 
which tell us, how to do what we want 
to do in the best way for ourselves and 
our fellow citizens. 
Thus we see that law-even law 
within these United States-is something 
far more pervasive, far less clear-cut, 
than a prohibition, an offense, a police-
man, and a lower court. We need to give 
it a far wider definition. Now the 
interesting thing is onee we move away 
from the idea that the legislature, execu-
tive, and courts with compulsory juris-
diction are essential to the existence of 
a legal system, almost any other defini-
tion of law includes international law_ 
If, for example, we are prepared to say 
that a legal system consists of a process 
of authoritative decisionmaking, in 
which basic values become reflected in 
social action by means of the decisional 
process and through the agency of the 
authoritative decisionmakers (including 
courts, but not restricted to them), then 
we find that international law fits into 
that definition quite well. Again, if we 
add thereto the concept of law as a 
system of facilitative means of social 
interaction and communication which 
contains prohibitions only where inter-
action extends beyond what is per-
missible in a mutually viable system, 
then, here too, we find that interna-
tional law quite clearly fits within our 
definition. Also, if we state that it is a 
most important means of directing par-
ticipants' efforts for the realization of 
common values, then, again, interna-
tional law fits in with such a definition 
of law. Now, I have stressed the prob-
lem of definitions because I really want 
to underline the distinction between the 
trivial point of arguing about the 
meaning of words and the important 
point which calls for an investigation of 
the nature of things. I must also point 
out that the definitions of law which I 
have just indicated seem far closer to 
the nature of law than the more tradi-
tional one which emphasizes power and 
enforcement at the expense of inter-
action and direction. I will close this 
section of my presentation by pointing 
out to you that international law pro-
vides prohibitions whieh states, like 
individuals, take into account when 
calculating the chances of success a 
given policy may have. In addition, and 
more significantly perhaps, it exists as a 
system of decisionmaking, of process, 
and of communication. Assuming a 
knowledge of international law is like 
assuming a knowledge of language. You 
can cue your friends and your rivals as 
to your intentions and then indicate to 
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them those of their options which are 
acceptable to you-and those which are 
unacceptable. Your game plans, inci-
dentally, should include the choice of 
your adversaries' selecting unacceptable 
options. These, again, should be clearly 
discernible through the language of in-
ternationallaw. 
III. THE NATURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW-
RESPONSES TO SOME CRITICISMS 
A. The Problem of State Sovereignty 
There is a more sophisticated variant 
of the skeptics' position which we have 
just discussed, namely that international 
law cannot be "law properly so called" 
since it is not issued by a sovereign 
commander, is not supported by sanc-
tions, and is not administered by courts 
with compulsory jurisdiction. That 
more sophisticated variation takes up 
the concept of sovereignty from a new 
point of view. It argues, not on the 
footing of international law's failure to 
indicate its own sovereign, but rather, 
that since it is an order of sovereign 
nations, it cannot for that reason also be 
a legal order. More briefly, this argu-
ment holds that national sovereignty is 
inconsistent with international law. The 
inarticulate premise of such an argu-
ment is that if a legal system is itself the 
child of sovereign authority it cannot, at 
the same time, incorporate many sover-
eigns. The restricted definition of law 
itself, which I outlined earlier, comes up 
again. It is translated into this new 
inverted perspective of sovereignty and 
the international order. 
But what do we mean when we talk 
of national sovereignty? From the point 
of view of international law, the sover-
eignty of a state is not an extralegal or 
metalegal concept. Rather, it is a basic 
concept of international law and is 
defined by it. Sovereignty is the term 
used to describe the competence which 
the international law ascribes to states. 
I 
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We tend, perhaps, to think of sover-
eignty in absolute terms. Yet no state is 
sovereign in the world today in the same 
sense that the Roman Empire was sover-
eign in the Mediterranean Basin, in, say, 
A.D. 100. The difference between then 
and now is that although every contem-
porary state is said to be sovereign, each 
one must recognize and act in terms of 
the sovereignty of all the others. For all 
sovereign states act and interact in the 
common arena of international relations 
wherein international law facilitates 
their peaceable interactions and is 
formulated to limit, where it cannot 
prevent, states' hostile or violent inter-
actions. International law thus may be 
seen, at one and the same time, as 
according and ascribing to states their 
sovereign authority as the form of com-
petence they enjoy in the international 
arena and placing the necessary limits 
on that competence in order to limit, 
and to humanize, collisions in its mutual 
and interacting exercise. In contrast 
with the contemporary world where 
more than 120 states interact in the 
same area of action, the sovereign situa-
tion of the Roman Empire existed 
simply because there were no other 
states interacting with it to limit its 
sovereignty. By contrast with the ex-
ample from the Roman world, the 
contemporary states' interaction calls 
for the ascription of competences to 
states. We denominate these compe-
tences "sovereignty," which becomes a 
legally defined and a relative concept. 
Admittedly, that definition is in ex-
tremely wide terms; but there are limits 
to it. There are limits to it set by 
treaties and by customary law. Ex-
amples of the customary law limitation 
on state sovereignty are states' universal 
recognition of the immunity of foreign 
sovereigns, their diplomats, and their 
warships in receiving states' ports. At 
such points as these, and even on the 
territory of the United States, our legal 
sovereign power stops short. It meets 
the opposing and countervailing sover-
eign competence of a foreign country. 
Thus, while it is so latitudinarily defined 
as, possibly, to weaken and undermine 
the orderliness of the international legal 
order, the concept of state sovereignty 
does not contradict that order. It can-
not do so, because it is, itself, a deriva-
tive of that order. 
B. The Problem of Commitment 
Tied in with the problems which the 
looseness of the international order pre-
sents is a criticism which looks, at first 
blush, like a restatement of the argu-
ment we have just disposed of when 
that is freed of its conceptualist impedi-
ment labeled "sovereignty." This attack 
on international law, however, in reality 
comes from a very different group of 
theorists. Those who argue that national 
sovereignty is inconsistent with interna-
tional law, and is a logical denial of it, 
are concerned about international law's 
failure to develop into a highly inte-
grated and formalized system of au-
thority. The critics whose position we 
are now going to review, on the other 
hand, argue against international law's 
validity on pragmatic grounds. They 
argue that because, as it is clear on any 
view of the way states behave toward 
each other, no state has an overriding 
and absolute commitment to the vindi-
cation of international law at all costs, 
international law either does not exist in 
international reality or, at most, does 
not reflect a meaningful legal order. I 
suggest to you that such a thesis is 
completely beside the point It is, 
furthermore, not only based on a cyn-
ical, Machiavellian view of the law, it is 
also based on a misconception of the 
relation of law and morals and of the 
morality of obedience to law. Everyone 
in this room has a sticking point where 
he would not have an overriding and 
absolute commitment to the vindication 
of the domestic law of the United States 
or of the State of Rhode Island. There 
may be situations where the law may 
call upon a citizen to do things that go 
against his basic moral ideas and which 
he will withdraw from doing. Thus, 
oncc we really start to look at the 
criticisms involving the issue of commit-
ment which frequently are sagely 
adduced to deny the existence of inter-
national law-including those by such 
eminent men as Dean Acheson, George 
Kennan, and Professor Morgenthau-we 
find that their positions turn on mis-
taken notions about either the meaning 
of law or about the expectations people 
might appropriately entertain of inter-
national law itself. Moreover, they do 
not, perhaps, think sufficiently com-
paratively in order to evaluate how 
people, in general, react to certain legal 
rules which might be imposed before 
they look at theorists' and states' 
adverse reactions to specific rules or 
doctrines of international law. 
The cynical position we have just 
reviewed is, of course, made all the 
more plausible when we remember that 
there is an issue many legal philosophers 
overlook when discussing the way in 
which legal systems work. The truism is 
this: there is no legal rule for applying a 
legal rule. Whenever any legal rule is 
applied, it is applied by a human being 
who is applying (a) his knowledge of 
law; (b) his evaluation and characteriza-
tion of the facts; (c) his ideas of the 
relevance of the law he knows to the 
facts before him; (d) the theory and 
morality of law he entertains; and (e) 
the policy goals of the law he holds to 
be relevant to the case. Now I am 
coming to one of the points I need to 
emphasize this morning. You all carry 
around with you your own moralities of 
law and your own theories of law. You 
are all legal philosophers, and you apply 
your philosophies whenever you face a 
legal problem or make a legal decision. 
Your problem may well be that, al-
though you operate from philosophical 
premises about the nature and morality 
of law when you apply a rule or discuss 
the meaning of law, those premises are 
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mainly below the threshold of your 
articulate thought. But, whether fully 
articulated and at the forefront of your 
minds, or operating as inarticulate 
premises or unconscious prejudices, 
they exist and they guide your knowl-
edge and your thinking about law in 
general and your application of law, 
whether that is to enforce the discipline 
of a ship, or to identify the relevance of 
article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of 
the United Nations to a specific situa-
tion or decision you may have to make. 
c. The Problem of Obligation 
This leads me, then, to the third 
point in our discussion of the meaning 
and function of international law. At 
least as significant a question about 
international law as the question, "Is 
international law really law?" is the 
question: "Is international law really 
binding?" This then leads on to the next 
question: "And, if so, what is the nature 
of international law's obligatoriness?" 
Many critics of international law again 
show their policeman hangup when we 
come to this issue. They point to the 
unsatisfactory means of enforcing inter-
national law. Owing to the deadlock of 
the United Nations Security Council, 
the only sanction is by the use of force 
by states. In this context, however, we 
may tend to underestimate the legal 
significance of joint action by collective 
self-defense. This, after all, was the 
earliest form of law enforcement in 
domestic legal systems and identified in 
early Anglo-American law as the "hue 
and cry." Be that as it may, it is still 
unfortunately true that the general hue 
and cry reflected in the United Nations 
General Assembly's Uniting for Peace 
Resolution has long been losing what-
ever effectiveness it may once have had. 
Again, resort to reprisals by individual 
states, once a significant sanction, is 
ceasing to be effective for a myriad of 
reasons, not the least important of 
which, perhaps, are such prohibitions as 
50 
those to be found in article 2, paragraph 
4 of the United Nations Charter which 
tells us that: "All Members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations." 
But to say that because it cannot be 
enforced, an obligation does not exist, is 
nonsense. Clearly there are binding obli-
gations in international law which states 
could only flout with full knowledge of 
the illegality of their conduct. We 
should note two well-known facts here. 
First, while states may act knowingly in 
breach of international law from time to 
time, their breaches are generally, in-
deed standardly, the result of decisions 
to take calculated risks. That is, states 
tend to take calculated risks regarding 
how severe or painful other states' 
condemnatory reactions will be. 
Second, no matter how frequently one 
state may breach its international obli-
gations, it is always indignant at 
breaches by other states. Hence it is 
clear that states review both their own 
and other countries' policies and con-
duct in the light of a widespread pre-
sumption that international law not 
only exists, but also will be obeyed and 
followed. Why should this be so? It is 
clearly because each state. anticipates 
that its own long-term advantage lies 
more with the compliance of other 
states with international law than at-
tempting to survive in an international 
order where international law has no 
authority and creates no expectations. 
Such an order would either be one of 
chaos, where each state is entitled to 
deny all claims by others not supported 
by sufficient strength to enforce them, 
one where there is no law but that of 
the jungle and where no right can be 
maintained except that of holding as 
much as can be physically mastered, or, 
alternatively, be one governed by the 
totalitarian authority of a single world 
empire. (For we may note, parentheti-
cally, that even a world federal system 
would still need to include much, if not 
most, of the present order for many 
years to come, and so should not be 
viewed as a valid alternative to the 
present order as much as one possible 
development of it.) 
Neither chaos on the one hand nor 
subordination in a world empire on the 
other has much appeal to most states, 
hence their acceptance of the present 
order in its broad outline and their 
indignation at breaches of international 
law by their fellow subjects of the 
system. Often, indeed, states brazenness 
when charged with breaches of their 
own obligations appears to reflect their 
acknowledgment of their duties and 
their guilt at their evasions. They seem, 
only too frequently, to remind us of the 
self-indulgent Roman poet's confession, 
videor meliora proboque, deteriora 
sequor-I see the better and more 
honorable course of conduct as I follow 
the worse. 
New states are currently accepting 
the international legal system as an 
order, while calling for specific changes 
to those of the specific rules and doc-
trines which they consider irksome or 
anachronistic. This is evidenced by their 
rejection of the Communists' traditional 
rejection of international law. It is also 
reflected at the present time, interest-
ingly enough, in Russia's willingness 
(together with her satellites, as dis-
tinguished from China and hers) to 
cooperate within the system, to abide 
by an increasing (if uncertain) number 
of the existing customary rules of inter-
national law in the name of "peaceful 
coexistence" and to prefer the chi-
canery of a shabby diplomat over the 
tactics of an outraged revolutionary. 
This review of states' conduct as 
standardly reflecting a general aecept-
ance of the international legal order as a 
system should not blind us to the fact 
that most of the new states are dis-
satisfied with, and many question the 
validity of, some of the rules we have 
inherited from the past as part of 
customary international law. But the 
rejection of some traditional rules hy 
some of the new states as irrelevant to 
the present international order and the 
questioning of others hy many should 
not he confused with a total rejection of 
the system. Rather, it is a demand for 
peaceful legal change to reflect the 
enormous social change in international 
society which has gone on over the last 
two decades. My message in this part of 
my lecture simply hoils down to this: 
We can, and should clearly distinguish 
he tween demands for changing the 
rules, doctrines, and institutions of 
international law from demands for the 
overthrow of the present international 
legal system. The former note is loudly 
and sometimes dissonantly struck, the 
latter is hardly struck at all; except 
sometimes in the rhetoric of an angry 
politician speaking, usually, either for 
home consumption only or in a spirit of 
malicious gamesmanship. 
D. Some Friends of International Law 
and What They Have Wrought 
One of the greatest disservices that 
has heen performed to international law 
hy its supporters is the overstatement of 
the case for international law hy the 
Great Optimists. In our culture we have 
a long tradition of heing suspicious of 
politics, politicians, and "the political" 
-namely the making of political issues 
out of issues which could he left to 
economics, jurisprudence, sociology, or 
any other science or psuedoscience. We 
have, since the 17th century, since the 
English Revolution, the French Revolu-
tion, the American Revolution, had a 
hasic philosophical value, namely that 
science and scientific man should re-
place politics and that ultimate scoun-
drel, political man. This, of course, was 
the metaphysical hasis for justifying the 
transfer of much activity, especially 
economic activity, from the puhlic to 
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the private sector. Its corollary has heen 
the proliferation of models of man as an 
ohject of science, "economic man," the 
"reasonahle man" of the law, and 
"sociological profiles," to name hut a 
few of the models of "scientific man." 
The model of scientific man may have 
originally developed as a metaphysical 
foundation for the privatization of 
social action. Today, paradoxically, it, 
and the traditional hostility to "the 
political," is leading to the proliferation 
of hureaueracies as the most "scientifc" 
means of ,directing predictahle conduct. 
This phenomenon is as noticeable in the 
international arena as it is elsewhere, 
and little thought has heen given to 
either the hasic justifications of such a 
proliferation (except, possihly, the 
political one of recruiting the leadership 
of the developing world in favor of 
international organizations hy demon-
strating their attractions!) or to viahle 
al ternatives. 
Any philosophy which can offer a 
program for eliminating the unpre-
dictahle, temporizing, and covinous 
qualities of political action and suhsti-
tute the predictahle conduct of "scien-
tific man" in place of it, offers a very 
attractive dream. Particularly, from the 
point of view of this lecture, the rise of 
the science of jurisprudence and of the 
reasonahle man, or bonus paterfamilias, 
gives us a means of replacing politics hy 
codes, constitutions, and treaties. The 
precision of jurisprudence and of legal 
logic could then, so the advocates of 
mechanistic jurisprudence and mechan-
istic man aver, he called to replace the 
imprecision of human life and the dis-
cretions of myriads of interacting indi-
viduals pursuing, in the puhlic arena, 
their private goals. As I pointed out 
earlier, this is an old hahit in our 
culture. Let us rememher that at the 
height of the Terror of the French 
Revolution, France's extremely dis-
tinguished "hlueprint writer," Abhe 
SiI!yes, helieved that all he had to do 
was to draw up a hetter Constitution for 
52 
France, and all that terror, all that 
bloodshed, all those executions would 
stop. He quite forgot that people tend 
to kill other people for reasons which 
are more compelling than the message 
of some words on paper, no matter how 
eloquently, rationally, or elaborately 
these may be formulated. Optimistically 
drawing up better documents, constitu-
tions, treaties is, in a nutshell, what 
some lawyers think they mean when 
they refer to that vaguely menacing 
ideal of "social engineering." (Others, 
including myself, mean something quite 
different, namely the improvement and 
addition of precepts, institutions, and 
procedures which facilitate intercourse, 
communications, respect, and participa-
tion; we do not desire to engineer 
society, only to engineer for society like 
real engineers do with hardware.) Trans-
ferred to the international sphere, the 
dream of the social engineers has pro-
liferated, because many people believe 
that the international legal order, above 
all, requires special engineering. They 
say that we can make peace permanent 
and secure if we draw up a better treaty; 
that if we appeal to the reason in men 
to see that this treaty is in the best 
interests of us all, everyone will agree 
with it, and perpetual peace will result. 
Now there are many people in this 
country and abroad who believe this 
fervently. And I have every sympathy 
with them. I only wish, first, that they 
were right; and second, that they did 
not arouse so much skepticism in the 
hearts of those who would otherwise be 
merely lukewarm toward international 
law. There is, unfortunately, a spillover 
of the skepticism these idealists generate 
toward the drawing of their more way-
out blueprints which sometimes seems 
to threaten to engulf international law 
in general. 
The professional optimists have done 
international law a major disservice by 
overstating the case for it. For them, 
almost every international problem 
becomes resolvable by a legal formula. 
Now this, patently, is not true. Lawyers 
operate on the assumption that all 
disputes can be formulated clearly and 
be made the objects of litigation, arbi-
tration, or negotiation on the footing of 
legal dialectic. Politicians, especially 
those opposed to this legalistic ap-
proach, seek to avoid putting their 
claims into legal, concrete, and binding 
form. They prefer to view disputes as 
tests of nerve and strength and so avoid 
making their demands rationally ex-
plicit. This is sometimes also true of the 
domestic sphere, especially in business 
relations. (It may be of interest to 
suggest that much of the problem the 
courts face with regard to enforcing the 
duty of good faith bargaining in labor-
management disputes tends to be re-
lated to the need to force parties to 
negotiate on the footing of concrete 
claims and counterclaims, rather than 
on the raw basis of nerve and strength.) 
The limits of what is appropriately a 
legal decision are aU around us, even in 
private life. For example, your attorney, 
whom you wish to instruct to draw up 
your will, may advise you as to how you 
should draw up a trust for your chil-
dren, but he is not going to tell you how 
to make a detailed distribution of your 
estate. He may advise you as to what 
sort of claims should be responded to 
when you draw your will. He may, in 
addition, offer advice, in general terms, 
about whom you should consider appro-
priate targets of your posthumous 
bounty. And, in discussing some possible 
basic family claims, he advises you be-
cause he is as much a trusted and knowl-
edgeable friend as he is your lawyer, 
although his experience as a lawyer may 
render his advice all the more worth 
heeding in this extra-professional con-
text as well. But this is because he is a 
man experienced not only in the writing 
of wills, but in the way people make 
posthumous distribution of their wealth 
amongst their family and friends. In a 
strictly professional sense he should, as 
a lawyer, accept your instructions and 
should only tell you or warn you about 
a distribution whieh you propose to 
make which may be so unfair or in-
equitable to members of your family 
that it might be open to attaek, in some 
jurisdictions at least, after your death. 
Where he gives you further advice he is 
not solving your problems, he is helping 
you make nonlegal decisions on how 
you could best use the facilities the law 
offers you. Incidentally, this excursus 
about the interaction of choices and law 
when it comes to making a will provides 
an example of the way society provides 
us with the means of doing what we 
want or need to do through law. 
We have already seen how interna-
tional law is facilitative and functional. 
We now note that it does not prescribe 
the goals of human action (the goals, for 
example, of human respect, participa-
tion, and dignity and freedom), al-
though it may be formulated in terms of 
such goals. These goals may be ex-
pressed by lawyers and he incorporated 
in legal documents; but they remain 
above and beyond the law, and the law 
provides one of many means of 
achieving them. For the ultimate de-
mands we make on life and on society 
are not legal demands. And it is a 
mistake to try and substitute the needs 
of life by the criteria of the law. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
AND LEGAL CHANGE 
We are told that in the "Third 
World"-the world of the developing 
countries-the charge is laid against 
international law that it is simply a form 
of neoimperialism. Only too often, how-
ever, this rhetoric is an attempt to 
forestall us in indicating to some of the 
emerging or developing countries what 
their legal obligations are. This is a piece 
of gamesmanship we would do well not 
to heed. On the other hand, these 
countries are also telling us that they 
have a demand for legal change. This is 
something to which we should listen 
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most carefully. But, because we have 
not been clear-cut in our thinking only 
too often, our responses to gamesmen's 
charges have been as conciliatory as 
those to the people who are making 
serious claims for legal change. Our own 
confusion about international law has 
encouraged others to assert the non-
existence, or the disuetude, of many 
legal rights which have a lively claim for 
contemporary respect, recognition, and 
vindication. It is as if, being careless 
about its own most valuable legal pro-
tection, namely law itself, the United 
States were encouraging others to be 
more careless about this country's rights 
than they would normally be. But this is 
an aside. We must tum back to our main 
problem in this part of my lecture, 
namely, that of legal change in intern a-
tionallaw. 
If, for the sake of an easy and 
familiar model in its general outline at 
least, we look at the domestic law of the 
United States for an example, we see 
the functioning legislatures as well as 
the courts and the executives. Now we 
know the function of a legislature is to 
keep law in tune with society, or at least 
we are told this is the function of the 
legislature. In contrast with this situa-
tion, there is no legislature or any 
similar institution in the international 
legal order which can be called upon to 
bring about timely legal change. But this 
does not necessarily mean that interna-
tional law is a body of archaic and 
antiquated rules which can only be 
found in the doctrines, writings, and 
practices of 17th century Western 
Europe which have remained unchanged 
ever since. Despite its lack of the usual 
accouterments of legal reform through 
legislation and despite the fact that the 
possession of a legislative organ would 
possibly help international law to be 
both more elegant and contemporary, 
international law does change. It can, at 
times, change with surprising speed. 
States can change their legal rights and 
obligations by entering into treaties, and 
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more and more international law is 
being expressed in multilateral conven-
tions. States may also enter into re-
gional agreements and bilateral treaties. 
As far as those treaties are concerned, 
states may also alter and redefine their 
legal relations amongst themselves very 
considerably. Again, a trend in bilateral 
treaties may start a new development in 
general customary international law. 
For example, one of the most signifi-
cant factors of the Alabama Claims 
Arbitration was not that this was one of 
the very early arbitrations to which 
sovereign states resorted, despite the 
very high and hostile feelings which ran 
on each side, but also because it was 
significant in the development of the 
rules of neutrality. This arbitration was 
called to decide a dispute between the 
United States and Great Britain after 
the defeat of the Southern Confederacy. 
The United States asserted that Great 
Britain had allowed the Alabama and 
the Georgia and their warlike equip-
ment, to be built and supplied by 
British yards contrary to the latter's 
duties as a neutral. 
The parties met in head-on dispute 
over the question of law since, at that 
time, doubts still existed as to the duties 
of a neutral state regarding the supply 
of war vessels to a belligerent. But, by 
the Treaty of Washington of 1871, the 
parties agreed to the famous "Three 
Rules" which have since then come to 
be regarded as substantially reflecting 
the customary international law duties 
of neutrals and, with some changes, 
have been formulated in article 8 of the 
Hague Convention No. 13 of 1907. 
They provide, in effect, that a neutral 
state must use "due diligence" to pre-
vent: 
(1) the fitting out, arming, adapting, 
or equipping of a vessel in its jurisdic-
tion which it has reason to believe is 
intended to cruise or otherwise engage 
in hostile acts against a government with 
which it is at peace; 
(2) the departure of such a vessel, 
once it has been fitted out, armed, 
equipped, adapted or built, from its 
jurisdiction; and 
(3) violation of these duties within 
its ports, roadsteads, and waters. 
Thus, in addition to their utility as 
defining, or redefining, the obligations 
of the parties and to expressing agree-
ment between states on a contractural 
footing by setting an example for future 
conduct, bilateral as well as multilateral 
treaties can start new developments in 
customary international law. Secondly, 
legal change comes about by what is 
regarded as a second source of law (as 
prescribed in article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice), 
namely by custom. Old customs can be 
dispensed with. Long before the chal-
lenges of the modern age, for example, 
the idea that a state could aequire 
territory simply by discovering it had 
disappeared well before the end of the 
19th century as a result of the teehno-
logical and population changes of that 
century. In previous eenturies, when 
explorations had been conducted in 
leaky wooden hulks, propelled only by 
sails or oars, an adventurer was able to 
acquire territory for his sovereign 
simply by an act of diseovery. In the 
19th century, with the introduction of 
iron- and steel-hulled steamships, we 
find that to recognize this as a basis of 
title becomes no longer feasible. There 
would have been too many title-
conferring "diseoveries"! Something 
much more came to be required before 
international law could recognize the 
acquisition of territory-so occupation 
came to be developed as a replacement 
of discovery as a legal concept which 
could validly provide states with original 
titles to masterless lands. Occupation 
called for more activity than discovery 
did, namely a real "taking" of and 
exercise of control over the territory in 
question before it could be said to 
belong to the claimant. Thus we have 
here an early example of technological 
and demographic change effecting a 
change in customary law. Today, of 
course, customary law seems almost to 
be withering before the rapidity of 
technological and demographic change. 
But this can be overstated. While some 
aspects are withering, others, interest-
ingly enough, are acquiring a new vigor 
and are requiring a new restatement. 
v. THE CRISIS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
My last observation is not intended 
to palliate the fact that international 
law is in a state of crisis today. This has 
many causes and more symptoms. With-
out any notion of ordering these in a list 
of importance, I would like briefly to 
indicate them as follows: the techno-
logical revolution; the population ex-
plosion; the decolonialization policies of 
the former European empires (Western 
European empires, not the Eastern 
European ones) and the proliferation of 
new "developing" states; the rise of 
single-party states as the norm of the 
developing world instead of the demo-
cratic two-party or multiparty politics 
which had been hoped for and opti-
mistically predicted at the time of the 
independence of more new countries; 
and, finally, revolutionary communism. 
But, as I indicated earlier, these faetors 
have not led to a widespread, root-and-
braneh denial of international law, but 
only to disputes as to the meaning, 
scope, and content of specific rules, to 
claims for legal change, and to an 
acceleration of social change. This last, 
the factor of acceleration, places inter-
national law under increasing stress on 
aecount of the paucity of its. institutions 
geared towards responding to the needs 
of accelerated legal change. 
On the other side of the coin we find 
there is a great and very important 
proliferation of universal and regional 
agencies. The central organization in 
international law is the United Nations; 
but there arc many more international 
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agencies than just this one. And these 
are becoming of increasing importance. 
There are regional agencies such as the 
Organization of American States and 
collective self-defense arrangements like 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
There are important universal agencies 
such as the Universal Postal Union and 
the International Telecommunication 
Union. These, I must emphasize, exist as 
institutions of international law. Al-
though you may not realize it, they 
affect your daily lives. The fact that you 
can have rapid and cheaply mailed 
letters from anywhere in the world to 
the United States, the fact that you can 
send telegrams anywhere in the world 
from the United States or receive tele-
vision news items by satellite are due to 
these and other important international 
organizations. 
Lastly, there is the peace-enforcing 
function of regional o~ganizations. I will 
just give you, as my time is running out, 
one example. The Cuban Missile Crisis 
in 1962, and the defensive quarantine 
which was imposed in response thereto 
were achieved through the procedures 
and processes of the Organization of 
American states. The U.S. Navy could 
act as it did only through the intelligent 
utilization of the United Nations 
Charter and the Rio de Janeiro Pact. 
Our trump card was the agreement of 
the Organization of American States 
that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were a 
threat to this hemisphere. We may hope 
that it is through the regional and 
universal organs of peace and progress 
that desirable legal change can be 
brought about in a timely way and that 
they will increasingly carry the burden 
which has come to be too heavy for 
customary international law and tradi-
tionally drafted treaties to bear alone. 
It is for this reason that it is now 
possible to discern an emerging quasi-
competence on the part of international 
organizations, and especially the United 
Nations, to indicate, by their practice 
and by their formulations of generally 
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held basic values and programs of legal 
change, emerging doctrines and pre-
cepts. These enjoy, in international law, 
at least the equivalent of the "directive 
principles" of the Indian and Irish con-
stitutions. In some cases, furthermore, 
they may have a more direct "self-
executing" effect They may offer a 
new source of law responsive to both 
the interests calling for change and 
those promoting the values of stability 
and continuity. To do so they must, 
however, reflect a general, if not a 
universal, consensus. 
----tfi----
